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Abstract

This study proposes a new mechanism for the resource curse: crowdingout of innovation due to the existence of an option to engage in conict.
Using a game theoretical framework, it is argued that an increase in the
amount of natural resources (in the informal sector where conict for a
common-pool rent materializes) reduces the incentives of entrepreneurial
groups to engage in cost-reducing R&D (in the non-resource sector where
production occurs). Compared to most models of the resource curse, the
impact of resource abundance on income and welfare was interestingly
observed to be non-monotonic. An increase in the amount of resources
in the common pool induces intensied conict among groups and less
R&D investment. Depending on the relative strengths of the income and
diversion eects, three scenarios were exhibited. First, there is a 1.) Pure
Blessing. This happens when both the extent of technological spillovers
and the initial level of resource are low. Starting from scarcity, the increase
in natural resource generates an overall jump in the groups' income levels.
Even if an increase in resources decreases innovation in the formal sector,
both income and welfare still go up. Meanwhile, for intermediate initial
values of the natural resource, there is a 2.) Pseudo-curse. A resource
boom induces an immediate income eect. However, this income gain is
dominated by the indirect diversion eect due to lower output and higher
price (because of less cost-reducing R&D). Consequently, while income
increases, the welfare of the economy decreases. The range of resource
levels where this occurs is greater when spillovers are high. Finally, a 3.)
Double Curse occurs for extremely high initial levels of natural resources.
Both aggregate income of the economy and welfare suer.
Keywords: innovation, appropriation, natural resources
JEL Classication: O13, Q33, P48
∗ E-mail address:

puzon@lameta.univ-montp1.fr

Laboratoire Montpellierain d'Economie

Theorique et Applique, Universite Montpellier I, Avenue de la mer- Site Richter C.S. 79606,
Montpellier, France. The author would like to thank Fabien Prieur and Marc Willinger
for their valuable comments in the early draft of this paper.

The usual disclaimer

applies.

1

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2013

1

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 781 [2013]

1

Introduction
Empirical studies suggest that countries well-endowed with natural resources

tend to experience slower economic development than their resource-poor coun-

1

terparts (Sachs and Warner, 1995; 1997; 2001) . This puzzle, the so-called natural resource curse, has resulted to dierent explanations.

2 The rst stream

of research pertains to the Dutch disease and deindustrialization. It notes that
resource abundance shifts factors of production out of sectors characterized by
increasing returns to scale (Krugman, 1987; Matsuyama, 1992; and Gylfason et
al., 1999). Another explanation emphasizes the role of institutions. The transmission channels for this stream can be distinguished into two: 1. centralized
and 2.

decentralized mechanisms.

The centralized mechanism hypothesizes

that when ruling elites are not benevolent, they tend to use resource income
for personal gain instead of public good provision (Caselli and Cunningham,
2009).

Meanwhile, the decentralized mechanism focuses on rent-seeking and

conict among societal groups (Torvik (2002), Wick and Bulte (2006), Lane
and Tornell (1996), and Tornell and Lane (1999)). Nonetheless, Mehlum et al.
(2006) observed that when institutions are strong, more natural resources may
eventually push aggregate income up.
These propositions on why there is a resource curse usually follow a crowdingout logic.

An abundance or dependence on natural resources crowds out a

growth-enhancing activity.

This present study addresses an additional chan-

nel through which natural resource wealth may aect income and social welfare.

It argues that an increase in the amount of natural resources reduces

the incentives of entrepreneurial groups to engage in cost-reducing R&D in the
non-resource sector.

Further motivation is provided by the observation that

3

resource-rich countries tend to innovate less. For instance, Maloney (2002)'s

1 However,

there exists two new empirical ndings on the resource curse. Compared to Sach

and Warner's utilization of export dependence datasets, Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008)
employed new natural capital data from the World Bank.
abundance does not induce any curse.

They found out that resource

On the other hand, van der Ploeg and Poelhekke

(2010) argued that the resource curse is not an entirely awed concept.

They noted that

natural resource price volatilities may slow down growth rates.

2

Besides the popular channels mentioned below, other hypotheses have recently emerged.

These include fractionalization and excessive investment (van der Ploeg, 2010), and negative
savings rates in resource-rich, developing countries (van der Ploeg, 2010).

3 Indeed,

innovation has been well-regarded as an engine for economic development. For

2
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historical anecdote observed that Latin American countries missed opportunities for natural resource-based growth. He argued that these countries lack the
innovative capacity arising from low investments in scientic infrastructure and
human capital. Empirically, using state-level US data, Papyrakis and Gerlagh
(2007) has also shown that resource abundance decreases R&D (Research and
Development) expenditure.
The contributions of this study are three-fold. First, it focuses on an interesting game theoretic, innovation-based approach on the natural resource curse.
While Peretto and Valente (2011) and Peretto (2012) have recently analyzed the
role of natural resources on R&D, they only do so by building upon endogenous
growth models. Peretto (2012) dened resource abundance as the endowment
of natural resource relative to labor. The primary sector uses labor to process
the resource input. The secondary sector utilizes the processed natural resource
and labor as inputs. The curse may exist if the aforementioned endowment ratio
is high. Finally, Peretto and Valente (2011) provided a variation by introducing international trade to the latter model.

When these labor and processed

resource inputs are complementary, the resource-rich economy may experience
stagnant growth. Overall, while the aforementioned studies observed that the
existence of more natural resource inputs reduces innovation, they are unable
to address the possible strategic interactions among non-cooperative economic
agents.

Unfortunately, to the author's knowledge, no article on the resource

curse has explored this intriguing perspective yet. In an attempt to do so, this
paper presents the rst game theoretic investigation of the potential trade-o
between cost-reducing process innovation and resource rent appropriation. The
game constitutes two stages. Compared to resource curse literature, production
only takes place during the second stage. The rst stage comprises of a trade-o
between innovation and resource grabbing.
Second, compared again to the innovation-based models which only regarded
natural resources as an input, this study's originality comes from its consideration of resource wealth as an appropriable common pool in an informal sector.
This is done by utilizing the elements of a Tullock-based contest (Garnkel and
Skaperdas, 2007). Again, the informal sector co-exists with an formal sector engaged in production, e.g. manufacturing. This formal sector is then characterized by an oligopolistic relationship among groups. Acting like entrepreneurial
rms, they also engage in Cournot competition. This feature of the formal secmore detailed examples, please refer to Aghion and Howitt (2005).

3
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tor, e.g.

manufacturing, is somehow consistent with the formalization found

in d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988).

Although the non-cooperative inter-

action among agents is the focus, the possibility of R&D cooperation is also
considered.

That is, groups may share basic information and eorts in the

rst stage.

Nonetheless, it is assumed they remain rivals in the marketplace.

As discussed in d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), a realistic example is the
European Strategic Program for R&D in Information Technologies.

Overall,

market competition is non-existent in recent static, decentralized models of the
resource curse which never considered any form of market structure. Therefore,
this research also provides a relatively new, yet simple insight into the relational
dynamics of natural resource abundance and quantity competition. Finally, this
paper incorporates the existence of technological spillovers in production. The
past papers did not vary the extent of technical externalities in their models.
In this regard, it is important to notice that this current study examines the
possibility that cost reductions are characterized by spillovers which may vary
in magnitude.
This article has shown that the impact of natural resource abundance on
income and welfare is non-monotonic.

4 The general ndings of this study are

dependent on the dierent natural resource threshold levels:
1.

There is a pure blessing.

This only happens when both the extent of

technological spillovers and the initial level of resource are low. Starting from
scarcity, the increase in natural resource abundance generates a jump in the
groups' income levels. Both income and welfare go up.
2. There is a pseudo-blessing. This can be observed for intermediate initial
values of the natural resource. A resource boom induces an immediate increase
in income. Unfortunately, the increase in aggregate income is not sucient to
outweigh the losses in consumer surplus due to lower output (and higher price).
Thus, the welfare of the economy still decreases. The range of values where a
pseudo-blessing occurs is greater when spillovers are high.
3. There is a double curse. This occurs for extremely high initial levels of
resources.

For this scenario, income and welfare both decline with a further

increase in the amount of natural resource.

With certainty, the decrease in

income directly induces a fall in welfare. When there is a a sudden increase in
wealth from natural resources, there is an intensied shifting of allocation from
an innovative activity with collective benets towards unproductive contesting.

4 Note

that there is a limited number of static models considering the impact of higher

rents on welfare. The most prominent one is that of Torvik (2002).

4
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This negative diversion eect greatly dominates the potential income gains.
Therefore, the aggregate income of the economy inevitably falls. This impact is
strong enough that social welfare also suers.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the basic setup of the
game. Meanwhile, Sections 3 and 4 discuss the potential solutions to the model.
Section 5 then focuses on the comparative statics. Finally, Section 6 concludes.

2

The setup
Extending the static setup in Wick and Bulte (2006), consider an economy

that consists of two risk-neutral groups. These groups can be regarded as conicting tribes (Hodler, 2006) or more aptly, entrepreneurial rms (Torvik, 2002).
It is noteworthy to emphasize, however, that this model diers because it is a
two-stage game where the nature of interaction diers between the two periods.
In the rst stage, each group

Ei

i

has an exogenous, total amount of endowment

to be allocated between cost-reducing R&D eorts in the productive sector

(e.g. manufacturing)

xi

fi .

and resource rent appropriation

In the second stage,

given their prior investment decisions, the groups simultaneously set output in
the productive sector. Notice that a greater market share in the second stage,
i.e. capability to produce more output, provides incentives for groups to invest
in cost-reducing R&D in the rst stage.
The productive, formal sector is assumed to be duopolistic in nature.
is characterized by an inverse demand function

q1 +
as

q2 is the total quantity produced. 5

ci (xi , xj )

P (Q)

and

xj

Q = qi + qj =

Each group's unit cost is denoted

ci (xi , xj )

that the other group undertakes.

are denoted as follows:

ci (xi , xj ) = (A − xi − βxj ) ∀ i, j 6= i.
assumed that

, where

which is a function of the amount of R&D eort it invests

and the amount of research
linearity,

P (Q)

It

0<A<d

and

xi

Assuming

P (Q) = d − bQ

and

To guarantee a solution, it is also

β(0, 1).

In contrast to existing resource curse literature, technological spillovers are
presumed to exist as in d'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988).

5 Resource

In this case,

curse literature (refer to van der Ploeg (2011) for a comprehensive survey)

usually assume that the payos from the productive sector is merely equal to the allocation to
production multiplied by a parameter, e.g.

Yi = ALi .

The prot is equivalent to the output

itself. Deviating from these, this paper assumes that the productive sector is characterized by
an economic market where groups engage in quantity competition.

5
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group

j

's R&D eort lowers rm

i's

unit production cost by a factor

β.

While

d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) consider an explicit cost of R&D investment, this article follows the usual specication in resource curse (Wick and
Bulte, 2006) and conict literature (Garnkel and Skaperdas, 2007). As noted
previously, groups have a xed endowment in private resources.

This implies

that investing in R&D reduces the amount of endowment available for the competing activity.
Assuming homogeneity in output
from the productive sector

M

q

in the second stage, the group's payo

is denoted as:

ΠiM = [P (Q) − ci (xi , xj )] qi

(1)

Alternatively, in the rst stage, groups can invest in an informal sector

F.

With the prevalence of weak property rights in the economy, activity in the
informal sector pertains to contesting for a common pool.

More specically,

groups have the opportunity to capture natural resource rents. Torvik (2002)
discussed that these rents can also be considered as public sector income subject
to a political struggle among entrepreneurial rms.
Group

i's

expected payo from appropriation is given by:

ΠiF = hi (fi , fj ) R
where
and

R

(2)

is the total value of the natural resource rent in the common pool

hi (fi , fj )

is the contest success function.

It is assumed that the contest

success function takes the most commonly used functional form (see Garnkel
and Skaperdas, 2007).

6

hi (fi , fj ) =
hi (fi , fj )

fi
fi + fj



1
2

if fi + fj > 0;

fi

to appropriation and

h2 = 1 − h1 .

j

(3)

otherwise

determines the share of the natural resource rent that

given it invests
and




allocates

fj .

In this case,

i will obtain,
h1 =

f1
f1 + f2

Intuitively, the more a group invests in appropriation (in

relative terms), the higher its share of the common pool.

6 For

more details on the class of conict technologies, refer to Tullock (1980), Hirshleifer

(1989), and Konrad (2005).

6
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3

Solution to the Model
This section solves the game using backward induction.

As stated previ-

ously, in the rst stage, cost-reducing R&D and resource rent appropriation
investments are made. Stage 2 is characterized by a simple Cournot game.

3.1 The second stage
Conditional on the allocation decisions made in Stage 1, group

i

chooses

the level of output that maximizes its aggegate payos from production and
contesting.

Adding up Equations (1) and (2), the total income of group

i

is

denoted as:

maxΠiY = [P (Q) − ci (xi , xj )] qi + hi (fi , fj ) R

(4)

qi

∀ j 6= i, i = 1, 2
The Nash-Cournot equilibrium can be computed to be

qi =

d − 2ci (xi , xj ) + cj (xi , xj )
.
3b

(5)

This result indicate that the existence of spillovers imply that one group's
cost reduction eort aects the production decision of the other.

3.2 The rst stage
In the rst stage of the game, each group

i

has an endowment

Ei

to be

allocated between cost-reducing R&D investments in the productive sector and
resource rent appropriation.

It is assumed that this endowment is xed and

exogenously given. Thus, if groups spend more in contesting for rents, then less
is available for process innovation in the productive sector.
Given (5), Equation (4) can be written as

max ΠiY (xi , xj , R) =
xi

fi
[d − A + (2 − β)xi + (2β − 1)xj ]2
+
R
9b
fi + fj
(6)

7
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s.t.

xi + fi ≤ Ei , xi , fi ≥ 0

As shown in Section 4, depending on the value of

(7)

R,

there can either be

an interior or a corner solution. Assuming natural resources are below a given
threshold, group

i

maximizes (6) with respect to

positive. However, if

R

xi

such that R&D eort is

is too high, there might be no incentive to innovate and

the endowment is fully devoted to appropriation.

4

Equilibrium
N

Dene (x

, fN)

as the strategies chosen by the group.

The R&D invest-

ment and resource rent appropriation eort levels in the interior equilibrium are
denoted as in Proposition 1.

Proposition 1:

1. There exists a unique, symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium ( xN , f N )
with
xN =

p
1
A−d
[E +
+ 4(R) ]
2
β+1

(8)

fN =

p
1
d−A
[E +
− 4(R) ]
2
β+1

(9)

9bR
2
with 4(R) = [E + (d−A)
β+1 ] − 2(β+1)(2−β)
2 2(β+1)(2−β)
if and only if R < RA with RA = [E + (d−A)
.
β+1 ] [
9b
Z
Z
2. When R > RA , a corner solution exists: (x , f ) = (0, E).
Proof: See Appendix A.1.

In the interior equilibrium, the arbitrage condition

∂Π
∂x

=

∂Π
∂a is fullled.

That is, the marginal benet of R&D investment (say, higher prots in the
formal sector) is equal to the marginal opportunity cost (i.e.
returns from rent contesting).

the potential

The results in Part 1 of Proposition 1 imply

that the allocation of endowment must be such that no group wishes to shift
between activities. Meanwhile, Part 2 shows that a corner solution may exist

8
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because investments in the two activities are bounded below by zero and above
by the endowment.

Indeed, it is possible that groups do not invest in R&D

at all. When the level of natural resources is extremely high, the incentive to
appropriate rents eliminates all investment in R&D. Groups' intial endowments
are completely reallocated toward contesting for natural resources. Indeed, the
two aforementioned scenarios denote the levels of investment when groups play
non-cooperatively in both stages of the game.

Nevertheless, the case where

groups coordinate their allocative decisions in the rst stage, i.e.

(E, 0),

(xO , f O ) =

can also be considered. When there is cooperation as in Hodler (2006),

the groups each gain an equal share of the resource.
Given the R&D and the appropriation investments
the unit cost

c,

total output

Q,

price

P (Q),

(x, f )

exhibited above,

aggregate income

2Π,

consumer

CS , and social welfare W of the economy can be characterized in Table 1.
d−A
d−A
d+A
For ease of reading assume that E +
β+1 = Ω, E − β+1 = Ψ, and E + β+1 = Φ.

surplus

Table 1: Summary of results for each potential equilibria.

x
f
c
Q
P (Q)
2Π
CS
W

Interior Solution
p
1
[Ψ + 4(R)]
2
p
1
[Ω − 4(R)]
2
p
(β+1)
A − 2 [Ψ + 4(R)]
p
2
[d − 12 (β + 1)[Φ − 4(R)]
3b
p
d − 32 [ d − 12 (β + 1)[Φ − 4(R)]]
p
1
R + 18b
[(β + 1)[ 4(R) + Ψ]]2
p
2 (β+1)
[ 2 (Ω + 4(R))]2
9b
p
1
R + 9b
[(β + 1)(Ω + 4(R))]2

Corner Solution

Cooperative Solution

0

E

E

0

A

A − E(β + 1)

2
(d − A)
3b
d − 32 (d − A)
2
R + 2(d−A)
9b
2(d−A)2
9b
2
R + 4(d−A)
9b

2
(β + 1)Ω
3b
d − 23 (β + 1)Ω
2
R + 2[(β+1)Ω]
9b
2[(β+1)Ω]2
9b
2
R + 4[(β+1)Ω]
9b

Groups are worse-o when they fail to cooperate in R&D provision. Compared to the cooperative solution, the results in the interior equilibrium show
that R&D investments are lower, appropriation is intensied, unit cost is higher,
the total quantity produced is less, and the price is higher. Indeed, when groups
play non-cooperatively, aggregate income, consumer surplus, and welfare are
lower compared to the cooperative situation. Outcomes worsen when the natural resource rents are extremely high and neither group invests in cost-reducing
innovation.

9
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5

Comparative statics
Focusing on the interior equilibrium, this part discusses the various eects

of a marginal change in natural resource abundance.

The eects of an increase in the resource rents on innovation eorts and
production in the formal sector are summarized in the following proposition:

An increased amount of natural resources reduces cost-reducing
R&D investments and output in the productive sector. Thus,
N
1. ∂x∂R(R) < 0, and
N
2. ∂q∂R(R) < 0.
Proposition 2:

The intuition for the rst result is pretty straightforward. More natural resources entails a higher common pool prize.

Ceteris paribus, a marginal increase

in appropriation investment may imply higher returns in the informal sector.
This makes resource rent grabbing more attractive to both groups. Hence, they
shift their initial endowment away from the R&D activity. This might be further
intensied by the free-riding-due to-spillovers eect. Knowing that they can
benet from the R&D investment of their rival, groups may opt to free ride instead. Meanwhile, the second part of Proposition 2 shows that natural resources
have an adverse impact in output. Groups engage in less productive activities in
the formal sector. When

R increases, the quantity produced in the second stage

declines because the unit cost is higher. The formal sector's aggregate output
eventually falls. Consequently, the price rises as
these ndings, an increase in

Proposition 3:

R

∂P (Q)
∂R

N

= −2b ∂q∂R(R) > 0.

With

obviously has implications on income.

Income is negatively correlated to R if and only ifR > RB =
2
+ d−A
β+1 ] . That is,
.

16(2−β)2 (β+1)(1−β)
[E
3(7−5β)2
∂ΠN
(R)
Y
<0
∂R

1.

Proof: See Appendix A.2.

10

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper781

10

Puzon: Cost-Reducing R&D in the Presence of an Appropriation Altern

With

RA > RB , an interior solution is guaranteed.

Thus, Proposition 3 sug-

gests innovative results related to the resource curse. The impact of a marginal
increase in the natural resource can be decomposed into a positive income effect and a negative diversion eect. Each group's aggregate income decreases
only when natural resource rents are high enough, i.e. when the income eect's
magnitude (positive) is less than that of the diversion eect (negative). That
is, the resource curse occurs when:

7

∂ΠN
∂ΠN
∂ΠN
Y (R)
R (R)
M (R)
=
+
<0
∂R
∂R
∂R
The existence of a threshold natural resource level is dierent from the usual
ndings in recent static papers on rent-seeking/conict and the resource curse
(refer again to Torvik (2002); Hodler (2006); and Wick and Bulte (2006)). In the
absence of property rights, these studies observed that there is an unconditional
negative relationship between resource abundance and income. An increase in
the amount of natural resources always decreases the total income of rivalling
groups. The results in this study, however, imply that income only decreases if

R

is above a given threshold.
As stated above, this paradoxical nding can be explained by decomposing

the two eects of natural resource abundance on total income. Indeed, these two

8

opposing eects determine whether a resource curse exists or not . Proposition
3 shows that the resource curse only happens when the indirect diversion eect
has a greater magnitude compared to the direct income eect of the resource
boom. The immediate, direct income impact of a higher natural resource rent
is a symmetrically proportional (i.e. 0.5) marginal increase in a group's income.
Hence, it is a one to one increase in the economy's aggregate income.

On

the other hand, the indirect diversion eect reduces income as investments are
reallocated from cost-reducing R&D to rent appropriation. This displacement
of allocative investment can also be analyzed using the combined responses of
both price and quantity. Recalling the payos for the productive formal sector,
the price and quantity eects of a natural resource boom can be decomposed
as follows:

7 The

∂P (Q)
∂q(R)
∂R (P (Q) − c(x)) + ( ∂R

−

∂c(x)
∂R )q . The rst term is negative as

result is the same when the aggregate income of the economy is considered. In this

paper, the aggregrate income of both groups is just equal to twice the total income of each
group.

8 Following

static decentralized models (Torvik (2002); Wick and Bulte (2006); Holder

(2006), Mehlum, et al. (2006), etc.), this paper denes the resource curse as a fall in income
due to an increase in natural resources wealth.

11
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∂P (Q)
∂R

shown in Proposition 1. The second term is also negative since

<

∂c(x)
∂R .

Therefore, prots from the formal sector is always negatively correlated with

R.

The negative impact of a decline in output (and the increase in unit cost)

far outweighs the price increase. When this diversion eect is greater than the
income gains from the informal sector, the total income of each group (and the
aggregate income of the economy) falls with

R.

To integrate the discussion, the resource curse indeed follows when the diversion eect dominates the income eect. When part of the initial endowment
is displaced away from the R&D activity, the group foregoes a potential increase
in income from the formal sector. Nonetheless, it obtains an additional share

∂ΠN
Y (R)
∂R

of the common pool. When

=

∂ΠN
R (R)
∂R

+

∂ΠN
M (R)
∂R

these two opposing forces are equal. Thus, with higher

R

=0

and

R = RB ,

the additional rents

in the informal sector obviously go up. Groups are then induced to switch to
contesting until a new equilibrium is reached.
Meanwhile, Peretto (2012) emphasized that the literature on the resource
curse should not presume that income growth is equivalent to welfare.

Pro-

viding contrasting support, this study now develops a static, yet convincing
nding that the impact of a resource boom on income and welfare dier. As
to be explained later on, the negative correlation between natural resources
and welfare comes rst when rents are above a given threshold,

RC .

The peak

of the relationship between natural resources and income only happens when

R > RB > RC .

Dening welfare as the sum of the groups' income and consumer

surplus, Proposition 4 formalizes this result.

Depending on the initial amount of natural resources and the
extent of spillovers, an increase in resource rents may negatively aect welfare.
(N R)
< 0,
1. If R > RB , ∂W∂R
N
2a. If R < RB and 0 < β < 0.5, then ∂W∂R(R) < 0,
2
N
.
2b. Finally, when 0.5 ≤ β < 1, ∂W∂R(R) < 0 if f R > RC = −8(2β−1)(2−β)[E(β+1)+(d−A)]
81b(β+1)(1−β)2
Proposition 4:

Proof: See Appendix A.3.

As shown in Table 2, focus is given to the scenario where the parameter for
technological spillovers is

9 Except

0 < β < 0.59 .

There exist four regions with dierent

for the non-existence of Region I, the results for the case with high spillovers are

almost the same (see Appendix A.3 for more details). A region experiencing a pure blessing
does not exist when

0.5 ≤ β < 1.

Thus, the region where there is a double curse encompasses

12
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results: Regions I, II, III, and IV. Region I and II reects the results for Part 2
of Proposition 1. On the other hand, Region III mirrors the results for Part 1.

Table 2: Summary of Results for the Case with Low Spillovers.

Impact of R
Range of R values
0 ≤ R ≤ RC
RC < R ≤ RB
R < R ≤ RA
RA < R

∂xN
∂R

∂ΠN
Y
∂R

∂W N
∂R

−
−
−
x=0

+
+
−
+

+
−
−
+

Region I shows the results for resource-poor economies with very low initial
values of

R.

Starting from resource scarcity, a marginal increase in the amount

of natural resources induces groups to allocate some of their endowment to
the informal sector.
down.

Thus, cost-reducing innovation in the formal sector goes

Nonetheless, the magnitude of this negative change is not high.

In

other words, natural resources can be regarded as a pure blessing. The shift in
investments does not immediately result to a decline in either income or welfare.
The resulting decline in R&D and output is not suciently strong. The initial
amount of natural resources is small enough that the resulting income eect of
a marginal change in
In Region II,

R

R

far outweighs the negative eect of diversion.

remains scarce that groups still have a strong incentive to

invest in cost-reducing R&D. This is reected by the increase in total income
even when the amount of of natural resources increase. The income gains from a
resource boom is much stronger than the negative displacement eect. Although
R&D investments are reduced when

R

increases, the benets from more abun-

dant natural resources outweighs this loss. Compared to Region I, social welfare
in II falls with an increase in

R.

Thus, in this case, more natural resources can

be regarded as a pseudo-blessing. This happens because the magnitude of the
positive impact of

R

on the aggregate income is outweighed by the decrease in

∂ΠN
Y (R)
consumer surplus: 2
∂R

N

< − ∂CS∂R(R) .

The gain in income of both groups is

not positive enough to compensate for the reinforcing negative eect of both a
decrease in output (due to less cost-reducing R&D) and an increase in price.
a greater range of values when the formal sector is characterized by a high degree of technical
externalities.
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Region III, on the other hand, has almost the same results as in II. What
diers is that the total income of each group now decreases with
ble curse is observed as welfare also declines.

R.

A dou-

The impact of higher natural

resource rents is negative on both aggregate income (producer surplus) and
consumer surplus.

As already discussed above, the groups' income levels fall

because the negative diversion eect of a resource boom dominates the positive
gains in income. Hence, the always negative impact of resource abundance on
consumer surplus is amplied. This negative correlation between resource rents
and consumer surplus is supported by Proposition 2. Due to lower cost-reducing
R&D investments, outputs fall. The decline in the total quantity produced, in
turn, increases price

R,

P (Q).

Consequently, when there is a marginal increase in

the consumer surplus always decreases. In summary, results for Region III

show that groups experience the a double curse. Both income ans welfare fall
with a rise in natural resource rents.
Finally, Region IV exhibits the case where the economy is extremely resourcerich and no group has an incentive to invest in R&D. Hence, a corner solution
exists. The amount of natural resources in the common pool are too high that
all groups allocate their full endowment into appropriation. It is as if the economy is trapped in an innovation-less scenario.
always xed, a marginal increase in

R

Nonetheless, having

x = 0

as

causes income and welfare (one-to-one

increase) to go up.

6

Concluding remarks
A new mechanism explaining why an increase in the amount of natural re-

sources may decrease income and welfare has been developed.

Although the

model is constructed in the simplest possible way, it captures an interesting
idea that a resource boom reduces innovative investments in the economy. This
is done by assuming a potential trade-o between cost-reducing R&D and resource rent contesting. Dierent from results commonly found in existing literature, this study found a non-monotonic relationship between natural resource
abundance and aggregate income. A curse occurs only when the initial level of
natural resource is suciently high. It was observed that natural resources can
be a blessing when the income eect dominates the diversion eect. Welfare,
on the other hand, almost always decreases during a resource boom.
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There are several potential extensions to the current model. First, to provide
value-added to the analysis one may suppose asymmetry among more than two
groups.

Second, a game with dynamic R&D can also be considered.

These

extensions are parts of the author's future research agenda.
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Appendix A.1: Proof of Proposition 1
Groups maximize Equation (6) with respect to

xi

such that constraint (7)

is met.

max ΠiY (xi , xj , R) =
xi

[d − A + (2 − β)xi + (2β − 1)xj ]2
E i − xi
+
R.
9b
E i + E j − xi − xj

∂ΠiY
2
−R(Ei + Ej − xi − xj ) + R(Ei − xi )
= (2−β)[(d−A)+(2−β)xi +(2β−1)xj ]+
∂xi
9b
(Ei + Ej − xi − xj )2
Assuming symmetry among groups,

∂ΠiY
R
2
(2 − β)[(d − A) + (β + 1)x] −
= 0
=
∂xi
9b
4(E − x)
⇔ x2 − [E +

1
9bR
A−d
]x +
[
+ E(A − d)] = 0
β+1
β + 1 8(2 − β)

To ensure that cost-reducing R&D eort

xi

is non-negative, the following

condition (necessary and sucient) must be met:

9bR
2(β+1)(2−β)

> 0.

a given threshold

If

4(R)>0,

RA .

then

Otherwise,

x> 0

x = 0

4(R) = [E +

(d−A) 2
β+1 ]

−

if natural resource rents are below
(i.e.

nobody invests in R&D) and

the initial endowment is fully devoted to appropriation,

E = f.

More speci-

cally, the following should be satised to ensure the R&D eorts are positive:

RA = [E +

(d−A) 2 2(β+1)(2−β)
]
β+1 ] [
9b

> R.

Appendix A.2: Proofs regarding the eect on a marginal change
in R on total income.
ΠY (R) = ΠR (R) + ΠM (R) . Thus, ΠY (R) =
p
1
+ 36b
[(β + 1)(E + 4(R)) − (A − d)]2 .

Total income is given by

R
2

+

[(d−A)+(β+1)x∗ ]2
9b

=

R
2

Dierentiating this with respect to

R

,

∂ΠY (R)
∂ΠR (R)
∂ΠM (R)
=
+
∂R
∂R
∂R
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1
2
|{z}

⇔

+

direct income ef f ect f rom the resource boom

2
∂x
[(d − A) + (β + 1)x](β + 1)
∂R}
|9b
{z
indirect diversion ef f ect

p
1
⇔ √
[ 4(7 − 5β) − [(β + 1)E − (A − d)]]
8 4(2 − β)
To determine the sign of

∂ΠY (R)
, the sign of the last term must be known.
∂R

For the resource curse to occur, it must be negative. That is,

√

4(7 − 5β) <

∂ΠY (R)
< 0 if the following condition is satised:
∂R
2
16(2−β) (β+1)(1−β)
d−A 2
[E + β+1 ] < R.
3(7−5β)2

(β + 1)E − (A − d) must hold.
0 < RB =

Appendix A.3: Proofs regarding the eect on a marginal change
in R on welfare.
∂ΠY (R)
< 0, ∂W∂R(R) < 0 always occurs. Note that ∂W∂R(R) =
1. When
∂R
∂ΠY (R)
∂CS(R)
Y (R)
2 ∂R + ∂R . With ∂CS(R)
< 0∀ R and ∂Π∂R
< 0 if RB < R, then
∂R
∂W (R)
<
0
if
f
R
<
R.
B
∂R
∂ΠY (R)
∂R

2. When

< 0,

∂W (R)
∂R

<0

only happens when certain conditions

regarding the magnitude of cost-reducing R&D externalities are met.

Given

∂CS(R)
< 0, it is still possible to have ∂W∂R(R) < 0 even if
that it is always
∂R
∂ΠY (R)
Y (R)
> 0 This is true if 2 ∂Π∂R
< − ∂CS(R)
∂R
∂R . Equivalently, this occurs
−8(2β−1)(2−β)[E(β+1)+(d−A)]2
< R.
when RC =
81b(β+1)(1−β)2

.

0.5 ≤ β < 1. In this case, R > 0 is always
0.5 ≤ β < 1 (i.e. when technological spillovers are

The left-hand side is negative if
satised. Therefore, when

very high), welfare is always negatively correlated with the amount of natural
resources. If

0 < β < 0.5

(low extent of spillovers), R should be higher a given

threshold, to induce a fall in welfare.
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